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Optimizing Expected Profit in a Multinomial Logit Model
with Position Bias and Social Influence
A. Abeluik · G. Berbeglia · M. Cebrian ·
P. Van Hentenryck
Abstract Motivated by applications in retail, online advertising, and cultural markets, this paper studies
how to find the optimal assortment and positioning of products subject to a capacity constraint and social
influence. We prove that the optimal assortment and positioning can be found in polynomial time for a
multinomial logit model capturing utilities, position bias, and social influence. Moreover, in a dynamic
market, we show that the policy that applies the optimal assortment and positioning and leverages social
influence outperforms in expectation any policy not using social influence.
1 Introduction
One of the most studied problems in the area of revenue management is the optimal assortment problem.
Informally, the problem consists in selecting a subset of products to offer to consumers so that the expected
profit is maximised. Such optimal subset depends on the profits obtained by selling a unit of each of these
products, as well as the purchasing behaviour of the consumers, which is represented using a discrete choice
model. Most of the discrete choice models of practical significance are special cases of the Random Utility
Model (RUM) in which each product i is characterized by a distribution Di that represents the consumer
utility. When offered a subset S of products, each consumer can then be viewed as a realization of all the
distributions Di and she picks the product in S with the highest utility. Some of the most studied discrete
choice models are the Multinomial Logit (MNL) [11], the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) [17] and the
Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) [5]. When consumers choose products according to the MNL model, the
optimal assortment problem can be solved efficiently [16]. This result was later extended in [13] to the case
in which there is a constraint on the maximum number of products that can be offered. However, when
consumers follow either an NMNL or an MMNL model, the optimal assortment problem is NP-hard [6,14,
2].
The underlying assumption in the vast literature that studies the optimal assortment problem is that
the consumer choice behaviour is solely affected by the subset of products being offered: The particular
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way in which the products are displayed has no importance. This assumption, however, is violated in many
real-world situations. Moreover, in many settings, social signals (e.g., quality ratings and recommendations)
are displayed together with the products. Once again, this is traditionally ignored in the literature.
The problem of finding an assortment and positioning of products that maximizes profit subject to
capacity constraints and social influence has numerous practical applications, from retail to online adver-
tising and cultural markets. Position bias is pervasive in E-Commerce and recommendation systems (e.g.,
[8,10,12]), while many settings also display of social signals to influence consumers. Social science studies
often feature both position bias and social influence [9,15]. It is thus important for practical applications to
study a model that jointly considers position bias, social influence, and limits on the number of displayed
products although, to our knowledge, such a model has not been analyzed so far.
This paper addresses this gap and studies a multinomial logit model that captures these three elements.
It contains two main technical contributions:
1. It shows that optimizing the expected profit for this multinomial logit model can be performed in
polynomial time. This result holds although the traditional regularity assumption is violated in this
setting.
2. It proves that it is beneficial to use social influence for maximizing the expected profit. In particular,
the paper proves that, in a dynamic market based on the model, the policy that uses social influence
and applies the optimal assortment and positioning at every step outperforms in expected profit any
policy not using social influence.
The first contribution generalizes the seminal results in [13] to include position bias and to study the role of
social influence. The second contribution sheds new light on social influence. Indeed, most studies focus on
showing the negative side of social influence, i.e., the increased unpredictability and inequalities it creates.
This paper shows its main positive aspect: Its ability to improve the efficiency of the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the problem specification and
related work. Section 4 proves that maximizing the expected profit in the proposed model can be performed
in polynomial time. Section 5 demonstrates the benefits of social influence. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Problem Specification
Consider a market with N products P = 1, ..., N , where only c ≤ N products in P can be displayed. In the
MNL model, each product i ∈ P has an utility
ui = qi + ǫi
where qi is a constant representing the inherent quality of product i and ǫi is a random variable following
a Gumbel distribution with zero mean and representing the error term. The no-purchase option, denoted
by 0, is added by assuming its utility is zero, i.e., eq0 = 1. Given a subset S ⊆ P , the probability that a
consumer chooses product i ∈ S is
Pi(S) =
eqi∑
j∈S e
qj + 1
.
In this paper, we consider the optimal assortment problem in which consumers follow the MNL but
each product must be displayed in one of N positions, each of which has a visibility θi ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ N).
Without loss of generality, we assume θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θN ≥ 0. A position assignment is an injective
function σ : S֌ 1..N that assigns a position to each product in an assortment S ⊆ P . The intrinsic utility
ui of product i when displayed in position j is shifted by a factor ln θj . Since
e
qi+ln θj = eln θj eqi = θj e
qi ,
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the probability of selecting product i becomes
Pi(S, σ) =
θσjui∑
j∈S θσjuj + 1
.
where ui = e
qi for notational simplicity. Note that, for any assortment S and position assortment σ, we
have ∑
i∈S
Pi(S, σ) + P0(S, σ) = 1,
where P0(S, σ) is the no-choice option.
Let ri denote the marginal profit of product i and assume that the no-purchase option has no profit, i.e.,
r0 = 0. The first problem considered in the paper is to find a polynomial-time algorithm that maximizes
the expected profit in this market, i.e.,
U(S, σ) =
∑
i∈S
riPi(S, σ).
Definition 1 (Capacitated Multinomial Logit Assortment and Positioning Problem) With the
above notations, the Capacitated Multinomial Logit Assortment and Positioning Problem (CMLAPP) is
defined as
Z
∗ = max {U(S, σ) | S ⊆ P ∧ |S| ≤ c ∧ σ : S֌ 1..N} .
This paper also considers a dynamic market where the perceived product quality ui varies along time
according to a social influence signal. Consider di,t the number of selections (e.g., the number of downloads
in a music market or the number of clicks on a website) of product i at time t. We define the utility of
product i at time t as a combination of the inherent quality of the product ui and a non-decreasing and
positive social influence function f(·), i.e.,
ui,t = ui + f(di,t).
In this dynamic market,
di,t = di,t−1 + 1
if product i is selected at step t and di,t = di,t−1 otherwise. More formally, the probability of selecting
product i for social signal d given a subset S and a position assignment σ is given by
Pi(S, σ, d) =
θσj (ui + f(di))∑
j∈S(θσj (ui + f(di))) + 1
.
In a dynamic market with T steps, the expected profit can be defined by the following recurrence:
Ut(d) = maxS,σ
∑
i∈S Pi(S, σ, d)(ri + Ut+1(d[i← di + 1])) (t ∈ 1..T )
UT+1(d) = 0
where d[i← v] represents the vector d where element i has been replaced by v and U1(〈0, . . . , 0〉) denotes
the overall expected profit.
When there is no social signal, the optimization problem is the same at each step t and the policy that
selects an optimal solution to the CMLAPP for each t is optimal. The second problem considered in this
paper is to determine that the effect of social influence on this policy.
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3 Related Work
This section reviews relevant related work, including some algorithmic concepts that are important for the
results of this paper.
3.1 The MusicLab Model
The problem studied in the paper is motivated by the seminal study of social influence in the MusicLab [15]
and the descriptive model introduced in [9] to capture these experiments. In the MusicLab, participants
enter a cultural market and are presented with a number of songs. Only the title of the song and the
band name are displayed. A market participant chooses a song and, after listening to the song, is given the
opportunity to download it. The MusicLab experiments were designed to measure the impact of social
influence in cultural markets. Participants were split into a number of independent worlds. In all but one
world, the participants were shown a social signal, i.e., the number of downloads of each song in their
world. In the last world, no social signal was displayed. The experiments were used to demonstrate the
unpredictability of cultural markets in the presence of social influence.
The descriptive model introduced in [9] was used to capture and reproduce the essence of this cultural
market. The model is defined in terms of a market composed of n songs. Each song i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is
characterized by two values:
1. Its appeal Ai which represents the inherent preference of listening to song i based only on its name and
its band;
2. Its quality qi which represents the conditional probability of downloading song i given that it was
sampled.
The MusicLab experiments present each participant with a playlist π, i.e., a permutation of {1, . . . , n}.
Each position p in the playlist is characterized by its visibility vp which is the inherent probability of
sampling a song in position p. The model specifies the probability of listening to song i at time k given a
playlist σ as
pi,k(σ) =
vσi(αAi +Di,k)∑n
j=1 vσj (αAj +Dj,k)
,
where Di,k is the number of downloads of song i at time k and α > 0 is a scaling factor which is the same
for all songs. Observe that the probability of sampling a song depends on its position in the playlist, its
appeal, and the number of downloads at time k.
This paper generalizes the MusicLab model in multiple ways: It uses a well-known multinomial logit
model, introduces a limit on how many products can be displayed (which is more realistic in practice),
and embeds the social influence signal in a non-decreasing, positive function f . All three generalizations
are significant for practical applications.1 This paper generalizes our own results on the MusicLab [1] and
show that, even in this more general setting, the expected profit can be optimized in polynomial time and
social influence is beneficial in maximizing expected profit.
3.2 E-Commerce Models
This paper also provides an alternative to traditional models from the E-Commerce literature. In E-
Commerce, the click-through rate (CTR) for a link l is the probability that l receives a click. This probability
1 TheMusicLabwas introduced for showing the unpredictability introduced by social influence in cultural markets.
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may depend on a combination of factors, the most significant ones being the relevance of the content and the
positioning of the links. The simplest model, which is pervasive in the e-Commerce literature (e.g., [8,12]),
assumes that the CTRs are independent. More precisely, this model assumes that the CTR of link l is the
product of a position effect θk and a relevance effect ql. This simplification makes the model attractive both
from theoretical and practical standpoint. For example, this model is widely adopted in online advertising,
since the optimal allocation is simply obtained by sorting the advertisements by decreasing θkqi. However,
the independence assumption of CTRs is not always justified. Experimental analysis using eye-tracking [7,
3] has inspired cascade models, first introduced in [4] and subsequently generalized. Informally speaking,
the cascade model captures a sequential search, where users consider links from top to bottom and only
look at the next link if the previous link was not selected. The model studied in this paper presents an
alternative which capture many interesting markets, while remaining tractable computationally.
3.3 Optimal Capacitated Multinomial Logit Assortment
Rusmevichientong, Shen, and Shmoys, in their seminal paper [13], consider a special case of the CMLAPP
where there is no visibility component, i.e., θi = 1 (i ∈ 1..c), and no social influence. In other words, they
consider the following problem.
Definition 2 (Capacitated Multinomial Logit Assortment Problem) With the above notations,
the Capacitated Multinomial Logit Assortment Problem (CMLAP) amounts to determining
Z
∗ = max{U(S) | S ⊆ P ∧ |S| ≤ c} .
where the profit of an assortment S is defined as U(S) =
∑
i∈S riPi(S), and the probability to select
product i ∈ S is given by Pi(S) =
ui∑
j∈S uj+1
.
One of the main results of their paper is to show that the CMLAP can be solved in polynomial time and
we now review some of the key concepts and intuition underlying their results. The optimal profit can be
expressed as follows:
Z∗ = max{λ ∈ R | ∃S ⊆ P : |S| ≤ c ∧ U(S) ≥ λ}
= max{λ ∈ R | ∃S ⊆ P : |S| ≤ c ∧
∑
i∈S uiri∑
j∈S uj+1
≥ λ}
= max{λ ∈ R | ∃S ⊆ P : |S| ≤ c ∧
∑
i∈S ui(ri − λ) ≥ λ}.
Observe that, for a specific λ, it suffices to rank the expressions ui(ri − λ) (i ∈ P) to find the subset S
maximizing the term
∑
i∈X ui(ri − λ). We can then define a function A : R→ {S ⊆ P : |S| ≤ c} as
A(λ) = arg-max
S:|S|≤c
∑
i∈S
ui (ri − λ)
where ties are broken arbitrarily. The optimal profit can be shown to be equivalent to
Z
∗ = max{U(A(λ)) | λ ∈ R}.
It is valid to drop the condition
∑
i∈S ui(ri − λ) ≥ λ due to dominance properties: When the condition is
violated for some λ, there exists a value λ′ < λ such that U(A(λ)) < U(A(λ′)). The key observation in [13]
is that there are at most O(N2) values to consider for λ and hence at most O(N2) subsets of P to consider
for finding the optimal assortment.
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4 Capacitated Multinomial Logit Assortment and Positioning
This section shows that the CMLAPP can be solved in polynomial time building on the techniques used
for the CMLAP. The key insight is that the CMLAPP only needs to consider the candidate subsets of the
CMLAP.
The first step in the proof consists in showing that there is no benefit in introducing gaps in the
positioning.
Definition 3 (Gap-Free Position Assignment) Given an assortment S, a position assignment σ is
gap-free if {σi | i ∈ S} = 1..|S|.
Lemma 1 There is an optimal gap-free solution to any CMLAPP.
Proof Let σ be a position assignment with gaps. Assume that no product is assigned to position k and let
l = min{i ∈ S | σi > k} be the first product assigned to a position higher than k. Since θk ≥ θσl , moving
product l from σl to k increases its visibility. If this move is not profitable, it must be that∑
i∈S θσiuiwi + (θk − θσl)ulrl∑
j∈S θσjuj + (θk − θσl) ul + 1
≤
∑
i∈S θσiuiri∑
j∈S θσjuj + 1
.
Let R =
∑
i∈S θσiuiri and Q =
∑
i∈S θσiui + 1. The above inequality becomes
l
R+ (θk − θσl)ulrl
Q+ (θk − θσl)ul
≤
R
Q
QR+Q (θk − θσl)ulrl ≤ RQ+R (θk − θσl)ul
rl ≤
R
Q
.
The last inequality states that the marginal profit of product l is smaller or equal to the expected profit.
We now show that we can remove product l while not degrading the profit. Indeed, rl ≤
R
Q implies
−Rθul ≤ −Qθulrl (· − θul)
RQ−Rθul ≤ RQ−Qθulrl (+RQ)
R
Q
≤
R− θulrl
Q− θul
.
The result follows.
Lemma 1 indicates that the position assignment of an assortment S only need to consider positions 1..|S|.
Hence, the position assignment is a bijection from S to 1..|S|. As in the CMLAP, we define a function
B : R→ {X ⊆ P : |X| ≤ c} as
B(λ) = arg-max
S:|S|≤c
max
σ:S֌1..|S|
∑
i∈S
θσiui (ri − λ)
which, given a value λ, specifies the assortment producing the best profit for some optimal position assign-
ment. The optimal position assignment σλS for assortment S and value λ is defined as
σ
λ
S = arg-max
σ:S֌1..|S|
∑
i∈S
θσiui (ri − λ) ,
Ties are broken arbitrarily in these two expressions. The optimal profit of the CMLAPP can be then
reformulated as
Z
∗ = max{U(B(λ), σλB(λ)) | λ ∈ R}.
The optimal position assignment σλS can be computed easily thanks to a rearrangement inequality.
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Lemma 2 (Rearrangement) Let x1,x2, . . . , xn and y1,y2, . . . , yn be real numbers (not necessarily posi-
tive) with x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn and y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yn, and let π be any permutation of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then
the following inequality holds:
x1yπ1 + x2yπ2 + · · ·+ xnyπn ≤ x1y1 + x2y2 + · · ·+ xnyn.
Proof We prove the inequality by induction on n. The statement is obvious for n = 1. Suppose that it is
true for n = k − 1 and consider n = k. Let m be an integer such that π(m) = k. Since xk ≥ xm and
yπ(m) = yk ≥ yπ(k), we have
(xk − xm)
(
yk − yπ(k)
)
≥ 0
This implies that
xkyπ(k) + xmyk ≤ xkyk + xmyπ(k) ≤ xkyk + xmyk
and hence
xkyπ(k) ≤ xkyk.
By induction hypothesis,
x1yπ(1) + · · ·+ xmyπ(m) + · · ·+ xn−1yπ(n−1) ≤ x1y1 + · · ·+ xmym + · · ·+ xk−1yk−1.
Combining these two inequalities proves the result.
The optimal position assignment must thus satisfy
uπ1(rπ1 − λ) ≥ . . . ≥ uπ|S|(rπ|S| − λ)
for some ranking assignment π : 1..|S| ֌ S and the optimal position assignment can be defined as the
inverse of π. We now show that the CMLAPP only needs to consider the assortments considered by the
CMLAP.
Lemma 3 Let B = {B(λ) : λ ∈ R} and A = {A(λ) : λ ∈ R}. Then, B ⊆ A.
Proof Consider λ ∈ R, S ∈ B(λ), and π be the inverse of σλS . π satisfies
uπ1 (rπ1 − λ) ≥ · · · ≥ uπ|S|
(
rπ|S| − λ
)
.
Consider first the case where |S| < c. Then, by optimality of B(λ) and θk ≥ 0, it must be the case that
ui(ri − λ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ P \ S. When |S| = c, it must be the case that
ui(ri − λ) ≥ uj(rj − λ) (i ∈ S and j ∈ P \ S)
since otherwise swapping i and j would increase the profit. As a result, for any S′ ⊆ P such that |S′| ≤ c,
we have that ∑
i∈S
ui (ri − λ) ≥
∑
j∈S′
uj (rj − λ) .
Hence S ∈ A.
We are now in position to state that the CMLAPP can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 1 CMLAPP can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof The result follows from Lemmas 1–3 and the fact that A can be computed in O(N2) time [13].
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This result is particularly interesting given the fact that the CMLAPP violates the regularity assumption
which states that the addition of an option to a choice set should never increase the probability of selecting
an option in the original set.
Definition 4 (Regularity Assumption) Let X ⊂ Y ⊆ P . The regularity assumption for the CMLAP
problem states that
Pi(X) ≥ Pi(Y ) ∀i ∈ X ∪ {0}.
Lemma 4 The CMLAPP problem violates the regularity assumption.
Proof Consider two products with u1 = 3, r1 = 1, u2 = 1, r2 =
5
4 and visibilities θ1 = 2, θ2 = 1. The
optimal assortment for each value of c is given by
c 1 2
S∗ {1} {2, 1}
Z∗ 0.8571 0.9167
p0 0.1429 0.1667
where the optimal position assigment is specified by the order of the products in assortment S∗. Although
the revenue Z∗ increases when moving from {1} to {1, 2}, the no-purchase option satisfies
P0({1}, σ1) < P1({1,2}, σ2)
for σ1(1) = 1, σ2(1) = 2, and σ2(2) = 1.
5 The Benefits of Social Influence
This section proves that, under social influence, the expected profit increases over time when using the
optimal assortment and position assignment. This holds regardless of the number of products, their utilities,
and the visibilities. The derivation uses ranking assignments, i.e., the inverse of position assignments, since
they make the notations and proofs simpler. Recall that ui,t, the utility of product i at time t, is defined as
the combination of the inherent quality of the product ui and a non-decreasing and positive social influence
function f(·), i.e., ui,t = ui + f(di,t).
In state t, the probability that product i is selected given assortment S and ranking π is
Pi,t(S, π) =
θπiui,t∑
j∈S θπjuj,t + 1
.
Under social influence, the expected profit over time can be considered as a Markov chain where state t+1
only depends on state t. If product k is selected at time t and if assortment S′ and ranking π′ are used at
time t+ 1 and i ∈ S′, the probability that product i is selected at time t+ 1 is given by
θπ′i
ui,t+1∑
j∈S′:j 6=k θπ′j
uj,t + θπ′
k
uk,t+1 + 1
Since f is non-decreasing, we define ǫi,t = f(di,t + 1)− f(di,t) ≥ 0 such that
ui,t+1 = ui,t + ǫi,t.
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We denote by Ut+1((S
′, π′)|(S, π)) the expected profit at time t+ 1 conditional to time t if assortment S
and ranking π are used at time t and assortment S′ and ranking π′ are used at time t+1. The core of the
proof consists in showing that
Ut+1((S
∗
, π
∗)|(S∗, π∗)) ≥ Ut(S
∗
, π
∗),
where (S∗, π∗) is the optimal (assortment,ranking) pair at time t. The expected profit at time t+1 condi-
tional to time t in this context is given by
∑
j∈S∗
(
Pj,t(S
∗
, π
∗) ·
∑
i∈S∗:i6=j θπ∗i ui,tri + θπ∗j (uj,t + ǫj,t)rj∑
i∈S∗:i6=j θπ∗i ui,t + θπ∗j (uj,t + ǫj,t) + 1
)
+
(
1−
∑
i∈S∗
Pi,t(S
∗
, π
∗)
)
· Ut(S
∗
.π
∗).
The bottom term captures the case where no product is selected at time t. while the top term captures the
cases where product j is selected, which increases its perceived utility for the next time step.
Lemma 5 Let (S∗, π∗) be the optimal allocation in time step t. We have
Ut+1((S
∗
, π
∗)|(S∗, π∗)) ≥ Ut(S
∗
, π
∗).
Proof Let u = u1, · · · , un represent the current state at time t. Without loss of generality, we can rename
the songs so that π∗i = i and drop the ranking subscript π
∗. We also omit writing the inclusion in S∗ in
the summations and use ǫj to denote ǫj,t. The optimal expected profit at time t can be written as
Ut(S
∗
, π
∗) =
∑
i θiuiri∑
i θiui + 1
= λ∗.
The expected profit Ut+1((π
∗, S∗)|(π∗, S∗)) in time t+ 1 conditional to time t, which we denote by U∗t+1,
is given by
U
∗
t+1 =
∑
j
(
θjuj∑
θiui + 1
·
∑
i6=j θiuiqi + θj(uj + ǫj)rj∑
i6=j θiui + θj(uj + ǫj) + 1
)
+
(
1−
∑
i θiui∑
i θiui + 1
)
·
∑
i θiuiri∑
i θiui + 1
=
∑
j
(
θjuj∑
θiui + 1
·
∑
i θiuiri + ǫjθjrj∑
i θiui + ǫjθj + 1
)
+
(
1−
∑
j θjuj∑
i θiui + 1
)
· λ∗.
Proving
U
∗
t+1 ≥ Ut(S
∗
, π
∗) (5.1)
amounts to showing that
∑
j
(
θjuj∑
θiui + 1
·
∑
i θiuiri + ǫjθjrj∑
i θiui + ǫjθj + 1
)
+
(
1−
∑
j θjuj∑
i θiui + 1
)
· λ∗ ≥ λ∗.
which reduces to proving
1∑
i θiui + 1
∑
j
[
θ2jujǫj∑
i θiui + ǫjθj + 1
(
rj − λ
∗)] ≥ 0
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or, equivalently, ∑
j
[
θ2jujǫj∑
i θiui + ǫjθj + 1
(
rj − λ
∗)] ≥ 0.
By definition of B, the optimality of S∗ implies that S∗ ∈ B(λ∗). Hence, by optimality of S∗, (ri−λ
∗) ≥ 0
for all i ∈ S. The result follows since, for all i,
θ2jujǫj∑
i θiui+ǫjθj+1
≥ 0.
We are now in position to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 Under social influence, the expected profit is nondecreasing over time when the optimal as-
sortment and ranking are used at every step.
Proof Let (S∗, π∗) and (S∗∗, π∗∗) be the optimal solution in time step t and t+ 1 respectively. Then,
Ut+1((π
∗∗
, S
∗∗)|(π∗, S∗)) ≥ Ut+1((π
∗
, S
∗)|(π∗, S∗)) ≥ Ut((π
∗
, S
∗)),
where the first inequality follows from the optimality of (S∗∗, π∗∗) and the second inequality follows from
Lemma 5.
Denote by P ∗ the policy that applies the optimal CMLAPP solution at each step. Theorem 2 entails an
interesting corollary about P ∗. Indeed, when there is no social influence, P ∗ outperforms any policy P
since the optimization problem is the same for every step. Since P ∗ under social influence outperforms (in
expectation) P ∗ with no social influence, it follows that P ∗ under social influence outperforms any policy
not using social influence.
Corollary 1 In expectation, applying the optimal CMLAPP solution at each step with or without social
influence outperforms any policy not using social influence.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by practical applications in E-Commerce and recommendation systems, this paper studied a
multinomial logit model that captures position bias, social influence, and limits on how many products can
be displayed. It showed how to optimize the expected profit for this multinomial logit model in polynomial
time. In addition, it showed that it is beneficial to use social influence for maximizing the expected profit.
Experimental results on the MusicLab [1], a special case of the model with no capacity constraint, an
identity function f , an obligation to make a choice, indicate that the algorithm provides significant im-
provements in expected profit compared to simple ranking policies and that the benefits of social influence
can be substantial. Future work will focus on generalizing the results to the case where market participants
have different preferences.
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